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We begin by examining the human traits that the leading mainstream economic theories of the 
firm consider relevant to understand the functioning of firms. We point out that the opportunism 
assumption (Williamson, 1975) differs from the “feelings of entitlement” assumption (Hart and 
Moore, 2008) which acknowledges both the negative and positive facets of moral behavior. Our 
thesis is that such divergence in the micro-foundations of the firm reflects the absence of an 
explicit and sound comprehension of why is the use of “human assets” more efficient in 
organizations than in markets. Such comprehension involves inquiring the specificity of the 
employment relationship, which we argue goes beyond authority/subordination to include a 
normative and relational dimension. The unique specificity of the employment relationship lies 
in the combination of i) some traits of human behavior with ii) the particular institutional setting 
in which work is performed and iii) the nature of work as a specific human activity. In any case, 
to soundly understand the employment relationship, one must go beyond the calculative abilities 
of homo economicus and endow him with moral abilities. 
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The trick in every case is to understand what is being contracted for 
Oliver Williamson (1982/1975:ix) 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the preface to the 1983 Edition of Markets and Hierarchies (Williamson, 1975) Oliver 
Williamson explains the success and relevance of the transaction cost theory of the firm by the 
fact that it is grounded on “human nature as we know it”. Contrary to standard economics, 
which he censures for ignoring the “human factors”, he forcefully believes that one cannot 
understand the problems of economic organization without taking the basic human attributes 
into account. These are, in his view, opportunism (on which we focus here) and bounded 
rationality. 
More than thirty years later Oliver Hart and John Moore (2008:3) recognize that the 
property rights theory of the firm, which they launched in the late 80s, suffers from 
“foundational weaknesses”. In order to develop a more general and compelling theory of the 
firm, they introduced, just like Williamson did, new behavioral elements into their model. The 
human attributes selected as relevant by Hart and Moore are the “feelings of entitlements” 
generated by ex ante contracts, feelings which, when aggrieved, give rise to shading costs.  
The behavioral micro-foundations that ground the leading mainstream economic 
theories of the firm hence are strikingly different. A first aim of the present paper is to elicit in 
greater detail the conception of human behavior that underlies the assumptions of opportunism 
and feelings of entitlement. Our argument is that the human factors put forward by each theory 
refer to profoundly distinct, if not opposite, human traits, which is very perplexing. 
Our thesis is that such divergence in the micro-foundations of the firm reflects the 
absence of an explicit and sound comprehension of why is the use of “human assets” more 
efficient in organizations than in markets – that is, why is the employment relationship more 
efficient than independent contracting. Such comprehension involves inquiring the specificity of 
the employment relationship, which we argue is very much related to the human traits 
considered to be relevant in work organizations. As put by Cheung (1983:3), a firm emerges 
when an input owner makes the option of “entering into a contractual arrangement surrendering 
the use of his input to an agent in exchange for an income”, ie, there are no firms without 
employees. The constitutive and defining feature of firms is their grounding on the specific 
institution of the employment relationship. This logically imply that to each theory of the firm 
should be associated a conception of the employment relationship.  
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This is not the case for many economic theories of the firm, though. If Ronald Coase (1937) 
placed the employment contract – and related authority/subordination relationship - at the very 
core of his theory of the firm, Alchian and Demsetz (1972) denied that employment contracts 
differ in any meaningful sense from independent contracting. The very term “employment” 
hardly appears in Gibbons (2005)’s comparison and formalization of the leading economic 
theories of the firm. In the same vein, Hart and Holmstrom (2010:510), in their authoritative 
paper on the theory of the firm, recognize that “our model [of the firm] does not currently have 
workers”. 
The foregoing considerations show that mainstream theories of the firm are pitched at 
such a level of generality that they do not acknowledge the specificity of the employment 
relationship. Indeed, Williamson declares that opportunism and bounded rationality are present 
in all economic transactions, not just the employment contract, and Hart (2008:409) states that 
the feelings of entitlement and respective “aggrievement costs arise under employment as well 
as under independent contracting”. That is, no real, unique specificity is recognized to the 
employment relationship. We claim, by contrast, that it is the very specificities of the 
employment relationship that account for why organizations are more efficient than markets. 
Instead of the conventional question addressed by mainstream theories of the firm, ie, 
“which transactions are more efficiently conducted in a firm than in a market?”, our inquiry 
focuses on “why are some transactions, namely the transaction of work, more efficiently 
conducted in a firm than a market?”. Coase’s (1937), Simon’s (1951), Williamson’s (1975) and 
their followers’ response is well-known: coordination by fiat allows a reduction in transaction 
costs and enhances adaptation to unforeseen circumstances. Our argument is that authority and 
subordination alone would not yield such favorable outcomes.  
The second aim of the present paper is hence to outline a more comprehensive account 
of the singular specificities of the employment relationship when compared to independent 
contracting. Beyond authority/subordination, other aspects of the employment relationship, 
largely ignored in received theories of the firm, must be acknowledged, namely its deeply 
normative nature, its encompassing a relational and personal dimension and, last but not least, 
the fact that the object of the exchange is not a commodity but work, ie, a meaningful human 
activity. The unique specificity of the employment relationship lies in the combination of i) 
some traits of human behavior with ii) the particular institutional setting in which work is 
performed and iii) the nature of work as a specific human activity. 
We build on Williamson (1975) and Hart and More (2008) – hereafter HM2008 - in the second 
and third section, respectively, to identify and critically examine the human factors considered 
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relevant for the analysis of the employment relationship in these two particular theories of the 
firm. Section four investigates the two unique features of the employment relationship: first 
subordination, ie, inequality of bargaining power and dependency, and second the specificity of 
the object being exchanged, namely work, which no conception of the employment relationship 
can discard. Section five concludes. 
 
2. THE STANDARD HUMAN FACTOR BEHIND MAINSTREAM 
THEORIES OF THE FIRM: OPPORTUNISM 
The immoral nature of opportunism 
The statute of opportunism in relation to utility-maximization is less than clear-cut. The theory 
of rational choice (utility maximization) is assumedly axiologically neutral – ie, amoral - 
because it only sets out an axiomatic framework for choice. But actually, most economic 
models introduce ad hoc assumptions into utility functions that give utility a substance. In most 
cases, utility is equated to self-centered or pecuniary motives, but behavioral economics and its 
social preferences models, for instance, endow economic agents with more or less moral 
preferences. Axiological neutrality hence ends up being more an ideological or utopian veil than 
an actual trait of utility models. 
 Williamson (1975) refers at the beginning of his book that opportunism is a “variety of 
self-seeking assumption […] akin to the prevailing behavioral assumptions employed 
throughout microeconomics” (p. 7) but he then says that opportunism “refers to a lack of candor 
or honesty in transactions, to include self-interest with guile” (p. 9). He draws a moral spectrum 
in which opportunism occupies the immoral end – it involves making false and self-disbelieved 
promises; stewardship behavior occupies the moral end – people can be trusted to keep their 
word; and instrumental behavior is located at the middle – a morally neutral behavior which 
does not deliberately manipulates other parties to further own interests (p.26-27). 
Opportunism was adopted by all contractual theories of the firm as the relevant 
assumption regarding behavior within firms. Hart (2002), for example, maintains that although 
firms would have difficulty surviving in a society in which honesty would not be taken seriously 
one cannot assume that employers or employees can be trusted to keep their word. He explicitly 
states that purely self-interested parties are not trustworthy parties (p. 1703) because there will 
always be an incentive to break a promise. Furthermore, he associates keeping one’s promise to 
“irrational” behavior (p. 1705). In sum, contrary to the abstract amoral utility-maximization 
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principle, opportunism, which became the grounding behavioral assumption of all mainstream 
theories of the firm
1
, clearly entails immoral behavior. Fehr et al (2011) who, like all 
economists, avoid using moral qualification, refer to opportunism as a “strong self-serving 
behavior bias”. 
 Williamson (1975) argues that when institutional design is at stake the only relevant 
behavioral assumption to adopt is presuming that human agents are prone to be opportunistic. 
His concept of “atmosphere” nonetheless acknowledges that the functioning of organizations 
may be grounded on positive moral features, if and when the attitudes and preferences of the 
organization members allow for it. Contrary to market exchange, which he considers tends to 
encourage calculative relations, internal organizations are “able to make allowance to 
quasimoral involvements among the parties” (p. 38). But he then removes these “extra-
economic considerations” from his analytical developments. 
Williamson notes that the “quasimoral involvements” have special relevance where 
employment relationships are involved but, since he conceives the employment relationship 
primarily as a specific-investment relationship, he is lead to emphasize again opportunistic 
behavior. This results in leaving the center stage to the rent-seeking and hold-up phenomena, 
subsequently extensively addressed in the literature. To sum up, the approach of the 
employment relationship espoused by Williamson highlights opportunism, ie, the more or less 
immoral utility calculations of employees; anything else is discarded as utopian. 
The centrality of the enforceability issue 
The behavioral assumption of opportunism, combined with uncertainty about the states of 
nature, obviously raise a major enforcement issue. Williamson (1975:7) strongly emphasizes 
that it is not uncertainty individually that gives rise to exchange difficulties but rather its joining 
with opportunism; similarly Holmstrom (1999) declares that the moral hazard or free riding 
problems stem from imperfect performance measurement, ie uncertainty about the state of the 
world combined with suspicion about the amount of effort provided. Note that the enforcement 
issue was never mentioned by Coase (1937) who seemed to take obedience by employees for 
granted.  
                                                          
1 Like transaction costs and incomplete contracts theories, agency or incentive theory is also explicitly 
grounded on opportunism, as revealed by its core building concept – that of agency costs – and its focus 
on moral hazard. We recall that Oliver Williamson is the leading scholar of the transaction cost theory and 
Oliver Hart the leading scholar of first, the property rights, and then the incomplete contracts theory of the 
firm. 
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It may be relevant at this point to explicitly define what we are speaking about. The 
employment relationship is based on an employment contract which, like all contracts are 
defined as “an agreement under which two parties make reciprocal commitments in terms of 
their behavior – a bilateral coordination arrangement” (Brousseau and Glachant, 2002:3). (Note 
the moral flavor of the terms “reciprocal commitments”). The employment contract is 
specifically defined by a particular coordination arrangement, namely authority/subordination. 
Entering into an employment contract means agreeing “to obey the directions of [managers] 
within certain limits” (Coase, 1937:39). What is at stake is obedience, on the one hand, ie, the 
compliance of the commitment to follow directions, but also, on the other hand,  the 
specification of what might “within certain limits” entail – an issue to which we turn in section 
four.  
Authority/subordination is an appropriate coordination mode when contracts are 
incomplete, ie, when they cannot specify which future events might occur and which 
adaptations should be made if they do occur. There are several sources of incompleteness in 
employment contracts, raising various types and degrees of enforcement issues, which call for 
differentiated contractual arrangements (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2012). For example, in 
incomplete contracts theory, economic variables may be observable ex post to the contracting 
parties but if they cannot be verified by outsiders – such as a court – they are said to be 
unverifiable and consequently non-contractible and non-enforceable. Hart (2002:1702) 
illustrates his point: a contract between an employer and an employee may specify that the 
former gives the latter a bonus in case of good performance; even if both observe ex post that 
the employee performed well, the contract may not be enforced – the employer may not pay the 
bonus without incurring any sanction – because courts are not able to judge the quality of an 
employee’s performance. In this case, the employee can never be protected against the 
employer’s opportunistic behavior.  
As for employee’s opportunism, a distinction emphasized by Williamson (1975:69) is 
important mentioning. Each employee always has to choose between providing “perfunctory” or 
“consummate” performance. Performing perfunctorily means carrying out the assigned tasks at 
the minimally acceptable level of effort while performing consummately means adopting a 
positive attitude, that is, using one’s abilities at work without deliberate restraint. The 
incomplete contracts literature considers that only perfunctory performance can be enforced; 
The specificity of the employment relationship – Exploring the micro-foundations of the firm 
 _____________________________________________________________________________
8 
DINÂMIA’CET – IUL, Centro de Estudos sobre a Mudança Socioeconómica e o Território 
ISCTE-IUL – Av. das Forças Armadas, 1649-026 Lisboa, PORTUGAL 
Tel. 210464031 - Extensão 293100  E-mail: dinamia@iscte.pt http://dinamiacet.iscte-iul.pt/ 
 




Before closing this section, in which we intended to highlight that in mainstream 
theories it is immoral behavior that primarily characterizes behavior in the employment 
relationship – which raises a major enforceability issue - we would like to contrast the 
economics’ with the law’s perspective. Masten (1988) denounces economics’ downplay of the 
role of the law in defining the firm. He emphasizes that, unlike commercial transactions, the 
employment contract embodies a unique set of obligations and responsibilities: “upon entering 
an employment relationship, every employee accepts an implied duty to ‘yield obedience to all 
reasonable rules, orders, and instructions of the employer’ […] In addition to obedience, an 
employer has the right to expect loyalty, respect, and faithfulness from his employees” (Masten, 
1988:185, 187, our italics). That is, the enforceability issue is to be resolved, in labor law, by the 
moral abilities or dispositions of employees. The counterpart of the employees’ duties is the 
responsibility assigned to employers for the outcomes of the employees’ acts. There is hence a 
sharp contrast between the rarely explicit assumption of negative moral behavior in the 
mainstream conception of the employment relationship – the word moral is as much avoided as 
possible - and the explicit reference to positive moral traits in the law of employment. 
 
3. THE NEW HUMAN FACTOR SUGGESTED FOR MAINSTREAM 
THEORIES OF THE FIRM: “FEELINGS OF ENTITLEMENT”  
Hart and Moore’s theory of contracts as reference points: the very “non-standard” nature of 
feelings of entitlement 
The objective of HM2008 is to advance the theory of the firm by providing a formal model of 
“haggling” costs. Note that haggling costs, as underlined by Gibbons (2005:218), may also be 
defined as “post-contractual opportunism”. Hart (2008) argues that haggling costs had been 
improperly side-stepped in the literature: transaction cost theory contented itself with assuming 
their existence and relied on relationship-specific investments to explain why firms are more 
efficient than markets, that is, why haggling costs are limited. In turn, the property rights theory 
of the firm, launched in the 1970s by Hart and co-authors and which subsequently evolved into 
the incomplete contract theory of the firm, avoided dealing with haggling costs by assuming 
                                                          
2 Though agency theory never refers the notion of “consummate” performance, we may speculate that it 
is in fact its irreducibly discretionary character that explains why agency theory sees employers as being at 
the mercy of their employees’ opportunism – which contrasts with the commonly held reverse perception 
– and that justifies its emphasis on incentives’ alignment. 
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costless ex post negotiation. In fact, HM2008’s endeavor can be seen as an attempt to explain 
why haggling costs/opportunistic behavior emerges. To do this, they introduce “unexpected 
human traits” into mainstream theory.  
 A key distinctive element of HM2008’s model is it being based on the assumption that 
only perfunctory (basic) performance is contractible. Consummate (exemplary) performance, 
which, they emphasize, is what is in “the spirit of the contract” 3  (HM2008: 3), is not 
enforceable. They further assume that performing consummately is not significantly more costly 
than performing perfunctorily, ie, employees may actually enjoy providing consummate 
performance.  
It is precisely to explain why employees perform consummately rather than 
perfunctorily that they introduce “non-standard behavioral elements” into their model: 
employees
4
 provide consummate performance if they feel well treated (positive reciprocity) but 
not if they feel badly treated (negative reciprocity) (Hart, 2008: 407; Hart and Moore, 2008, 
p.7). Whether employees feel well or badly treated depends on whether they get what they 
believe they are entitled to; if they don’t get it, they feel aggrieved and shade. The problem the 
model is supposed to solve is that the parties may diverge in their valuation of the action or 
activity contracted for. An employee may convince herself that her contribution is very valuable 
and that she deserves and is entitled to being highly rewarded but the employer may have a 
different valuation. Employees “shade” on consummate performance in proportion to the 
amount they feel aggrieved. Aggrievement and shading costs are like haggling costs. 
 The core idea of the contracts as reference points’ model is the following: the 
contracting parties’ sense of entitlement is determined by the (incomplete) contract they write 
ex ante. This is the sense in which a contract is a reference point. HM2008 analyze the 
conditions under which an employment contract (one in which the buyer chooses the method of 
production) is preferred to independent contracting (in which the seller chooses the method). In 
the model, the contracting parties meet in a competitive (labor) market at date 0, in which they 
write a contract (the price is fixed, equal to that set in the competitive market, and they decide 
on the contract type) and the transaction takes actually place at date 1. Because there is 
uncertainty about the future state of the world, ie, they cannot specify the method of production 
or tasks to be performed, they write an incomplete contract. The state of the world becomes 
                                                          
3 It is worth noting that consummate performance is indeed what is assumed in labor law, which explicitly 
acknowledges that it involves loyalty and compliance with commitments. 
4  HM2008 use this reasoning to account for the behavior of contracting parties in general, not just 
employees’ behavior. But the employment contract fits well in their framework since it fixes wages in 
advance and leaves discretion to the employer to choose tasks and for the employee to choose between 
consummate and perfunctory performance ex post. We focus only on the employment contract case here. 
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known – assumedly by both parties without any disagreement on its interpretation - at date 1. 
The parties decide to choose an employment rather than an independent contract at stage 0 
depending on the objective productive surplus plus the aggrievement costs they calculate will be 
generated by each option. Aggrievement causes psychic loss to the party experiencing it and the 
party offsets this by shading, ie, by hurting the other party through performing perfunctorily. 
The role of the ex ante contract is to minimize aggrievement and hence shading costs by 
embodying and restraining what parties feel entitled to - parties only feel entitled to the best 
outcome they may reach within the outcomes stipulated in the contract and do not consider 
outcomes outside the contract. 
 Laboratorial experiments have been specifically designed to verify whether HM2008 
behavioral assumptions are empirically justified. The evidence reported in Fehr et al (2011) 
supports the view that a contract concluded in a competitive ex ante market functions as a 
reference point for ex post transactions, but when the contract terms are determined in a non-
competitive way, HM2008 predictions about shading behavior in rigid contracts do not hold 
(rigid contracts do not help to avoid shading anymore). This shows that it is not only the terms 
of the contract that matter but also the competitiveness of the environment in which it was 
concluded (Fehr et al, 2009). Therefore, the assumption that ex ante contracts are negotiated 
under competitive conditions, besides eliminating possible disagreement on prices at stage 0, 
considerably limits the scope of validity of the model.  
 Fehr et al (2011, 2009) relate the behavioral elements introduced in HM2008 to the 
behavioral economics literature, namely theories of inequity aversion, fairness theories and 
reciprocity models. They explain shading behavior by the fact – observed in countless 
experiments and routinely assumed in social preferences models – that people are willing to 
engage in costly behavior – perfunctory performance in the case at hand – to punish 
inappropriate or unfair behavior. Perceived payoff inequalities trigger shading on performance 
in order to mitigate inequality. The feelings of entitlement assumption hence amounts to include 
in the parties’ utility functions social considerations and fairness concerns. This is a point worth 
emphasizing for the purpose of the present paper: whilst all mainstream theories of the firm are 
grounded on the negative moral traits of humans, HM2008 puts positive moral traits, or at least 
moral abilities, forward in their attempt to provide firmer micro-foundations for the theory of 
the firm. 
 However, Fehr et al (2011) draw attention to two notable differences between HM2008 
and the fairness literature. First, HM2008’s assumption that each party feels entitled to the most 
favorable outcome permitted by the contract supposes a self-serving bias stronger than is 
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usually presumed in fairness models. That is, the extent of opportunism assumed in HM2008 is 
overrated when compared to experimental findings. But the most crucial difference concerns the 
key HM2008’s assumption that people perceive outcomes of a competitive bargaining process 
(wages in the case at hand) to be acceptable or fair, an assumption confirmed by experimental 
findings. This means that outcomes of a competitive process may also generate consummate 
behavior. By contrast, the behavioral literature assumes, in the gift exchange experiments in 
particular, that consummate performance might only be triggered by the employer generosity, 
not outcomes of competitive processes. The experimental testing of HM2008’s model showed 
that employers “can circumvent the punishment for unequal outcomes by delegating the 
determination of the outcome to the forces of a competitive market” (Fehr et al, 2011:521).5 
Feelings of entitlement, norms and relational contracts – going beyond Hart and More (2008) 
A striking inconsistency comes out of Hart’s works. He his Norms and the theory of the firm 
paper, he claims that although norms are very important in the real world, incorporating them 
into the theory of the firm does not advance the understanding of firms nor does it lead to very 
different predictions (2002:1701). Indeed, the word norms never appear in HM2008. Yet, 
feelings of entitlement can hardly be conceived of without acknowledging their grounding on 
norms – norms, not preferences. 
An interpretation of HM2008 that explicitly highlights its normative character is 
provided by Akerlof (2010). Akerlof defines norms as “views as to what people should do. 
Norms matter because they determine what people consider to be fair, and when individuals feel 
badly treated, they become angry” (Akerlof, 2010:1). This is just what HM2008 assume: the 
contract signed by the parties at stage 0 determines what they feel entitled to and thereby what 
may make them angry or aggrieved ex post. In Akerlof (2010)’s reading, contracts constitute 
reference points because they establish a norm that the parties should meet their terms. He 
develops a two-period psychological game to give foundations for HM2008 aggrievement 
model in which a party’s feelings of entitlement translate into her feeling that the other party has 
a duty to behave in a given way. Like in HM2008, the shading of performance is viewed as a 
punishment of the other party. In HM2008, a party A is punished for not providing a party B the 
outcome party B feels she deserves. Akerlof (2010) rephrases the situation as party B punishing 
party A because she perceives that party A is not complying with her duty.  
                                                          
5 We may note that this is the basic strategy of neo-liberal ideology. The employment relationship evolved 
along the 20th century as a typical non-competitive circumstance in which employment law protects 
employees from the forces of the market, but the unfortunate trend of recent decades is precisely the shift 
towards a less protective setting. 
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Along with arguing that contracts establish “internal” norms, Akerlof (2010) also 
acknowledges, and this is a different point, that norms external to the contract also matter to 
understanding how the terms of a contract are to be met. In sum, Akerlof (2010) sheds light on 
and shows the extent to which HM2008’s argument, which is entirely depicted in contractual 
terms, actually relies on the normative, not merely contractual dimensions of human behavior. 
That contracts are pervaded by internal norms and embedded in social norms is the issue 
addressed in the relational contract law literature
6, which emphasizes that “the first thing to note 
about contract is the fact that it concerns social behavior […] A contract is an edifice partly built 
by the parties but also partly built by society” (Macneil, quoted in Campbell, 2001:7, 8). If 
HM2008 focus on the (internal) terms generated by ex ante contracts, the introduction of the 
“feelings of entitlement” ingredient actually involves broader social and moral norms, namely 
fairness and reciprocity, terms they indeed frequently use in developing their argument.  
The HM2008 ex ante contract is not established between ontologically isolated 
individuals but between subjects endowed with different subjective valuations of given 
outcomes, and the contract generates and triggers an inter-subjective and normative reality that 
will guide their behavior and orient their judgment of what is the proper, acceptable behavior to 
expect
7
. Contracts as conceived by HM2008 are relational contracts in the sense that the extent 
to which they are complied with is interpreted by the contracting parties through the 
mobilization of social norms. The normative dimension introduced in HM2008 epitomizes a 
break with the strictly calculative world of mainstream economics. It implicitly involves rather 
than ignores the social matrix in which contracts are established by implicitly recognizing the 
role of binding and regulatory norms external to the contract. Thus conceived, contracts are 
social constructions and the impact of the relational particularities of a given type of contract 
must then be incorporated in the analysis.   
Macneil considers that contracts can be established and governed efficiently only if the 
parties adopt a consciously cooperative attitude, ie, if they consciously renounce to maximizing 
utility in the short run in order to allow for the transaction to yield the maximum exchange 
surplus in the long run (Campbell, 2001). Indeed, relational contracts, in law as in mainstream 
economics (Baker et al, 2002), are basically defined by their long-term character and by their 
being based in informal agreements. Both relational contracts literatures consider that when 
people interact over time, threats, promises and commitments concerning future behavior 
                                                          
6 We rely on Campbell (2001)’s account of Macneil’s theory of relational contracts. This theory depicts 
contracts as positioned in a spectrum from almost purely discrete contracts to almost entirely relational 
ones; the employment contract locates at the relational end of the spectrum. 
7  It is worth noting that, in HM2008, unlike performance, the price/wage is “objectively” set by the 
competitive market. Prices and wages are then shielded from subjective and normative valuations. 
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influence current behavior, which renders them self-enforcing. Economists use repeated-games 
models to analyze relational contracts (Gibbons, 1997; Baker et al, 2002). The logic is that the 
shadow of the future subdues the temptations of the present. Cooperation becomes the optimal 
strategy if the present value of the current and future payoffs from cooperation exceeds the 
present value of the higher current payoff from defection followed by the lower payoff from 
punishment. HM2008 and Hart (2002) explicitly denounce relational models; in their view, they 
provide a false because utopian solution to the issue of contract enforcement. Repeated 
interactions do not solve the opportunism issue and their theory of contracts as reference points 
is explicitly proposed as a firmer alternative solution to the enforceability issue. 
Notwithstanding, conceiving employment relationships as relational contracts capture 
some of their important features. Employment relationships - with a growing number of 
exceptions, to be fair – are usually of a long-term and open-ended nature. For a large part, their 
effective economic efficiency derives from the substantial relationship-specific investments 
made by both parties, which provide powerful incentives to comply with “reciprocal 
commitments”. But the superior efficiency of employment relationships when compared to 
commercial contracts also comes from what is emphasized in the relational contracts literature, 
namely that the relational norms, unwritten codes of conduct and shared understandings which 
emerge from frequent interaction contribute to preserving the relation and facilitate cooperative 
adjustment. And frequent interaction is heightened by employees being integrated into an 
organization. 
Even Hart and Holstrom (2010:510) claim that the frequent interactions occurring in 
workplaces deserve further study since they may foster a “common vision that aligns interests” 
or “a concern for the workers’ well-being”. Supplying a “satisfying exchange relation” was 
pointed out by Williamson (75:38) as being part of the economic problem. In the same vein, 
Kreps (1996) identifies several phenomena that need theoretical scrutiny, namely the social 
embeddedness of the employment relationship, its gift-exchange dimension (following Akerlof, 
1982), and the “escalating commitments” that accompany long-term relationships. Much of 
these phenomena are captured by the relational contract literature. 
However, the economics relational contract approach is far from exhausting all the 
relevant aspects of employment relationships. Firstly it sidesteps the inequality of bargaining 
power that explicitly distinguishes in law the employment from commercial contracts and in 
firms the decision power of non-human assets owners relative to that of human assets owners 
(to use established economic terminology).  We return to that point later. Secondly, given that 
the economics relational approach is meant to encompass contracts within firms as well as 
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between firms (Gibbons, 2005; Baker et al, 2002) it discards the personal nature of employment 
relationships. 
As referred, neither party reneges on her commitments because of the future value of 
the relationship, which means that the self-enforcing propriety of relational contracts lies on 
utility calculations, nothing more. Relational models suppose that informal means of 
communication (unwritten behavioral rules, shared understandings) are used to ensure 
coordination but the goal pursued is long run self-interest. Both the means, which are informal 
but not necessarily personal, and the goal of relational contracts are “economic” in the sense 
defined by mainstream economics, ie, encompassing behavior restricted to self-interest 
calculations (Gibbons, 1997). In this respect, HM2008 provide a much more interesting account 
of contracts, one that actually relies on “non-standard” economic human attributes – feelings of 
entitlement, aggrievement and shading rather than restricted self-interest. In fact HM2008:33 
admit that they may be opening a “black box” and wonder whether their approach is “consistent 
with utility maximizing behavior”. 
Brodie (2011) emphasizes the fact that employment relationships have very “personal” 
specificities. He underlines that several courts have recently come to view “the employment 
contract as governing personal relations” and involving “greater mutual dependence and trust, 
with a correspondingly greater opportunity for harm or abuse” (Brodie, 2011:6,7). 
But what does “personal” specifically mean? The HM2008’s assumption that shading 
and consummate performance are “not contractible” (HM2008:11) provides an illuminating 
instance. The distinguishing feature of these traits of human behavior is their moral nature, in 
their negative and positive facets respectively, and this is what is not contractible. The use by 
social scientists of the notion of “person” rather than “individual” is precisely meant to 
contemplate the moral dimension and the social constitution of human beings (Harris, 1989). 
When HM2008 introduce “feelings of entitlement” into the analysis, they are actually bringing 
in human abilities that go beyond calculative abilities
8
, namely moral abilities - the ability to 
interpret and judge other’s actions. Agents who feel entitled and deceived, who retaliate and 
compensate possess an anthropological endowment different from that of the homo 
oeconomicus.  
In our view, the micro-foundations proposed by HM2008 represent a really profound 
break with calculative rationality; the move is surely far less innocuous than intended by the 
authors. What HM2008 are actually saying is that conceiving coordination among behaviors is 
                                                          
8 It must nonetheless be beard in mind that in HM2008 the feelings of entitlement and the behavior they 
trigger are exclusively analyzed in terms of utility calculations. 
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impossible without conceiving coordination among judgments upon behaviors (Favereau, 
2005). And the behavior prompted by these judgments can be of a generous – consummate– or 
mean – perfunctory - nature. That is, these new micro-foundations acknowledge the full range 
of moral behavior rather than the exclusive immoral facet of opportunism, on which Williamson 
focused. 
To sum up, two particularities of the employment relationship have been examined so 
far, namely its intensive relational and personal – normative - character The relational aspect 
emphasizes the potential for self-enforcement (in case employment contracts are long term) 
while the personal aspect emphasizes the sensitivity to the specific organizational and 
institutional “atmosphere” in which employment relationships take place (enforcement then 
depends on whether people feel well or badly treated). However, these features are not specific 
to employment relationships.  
 
4. THE TWO UNIQUE SPECIFICITIES OF THE EMPLOYMENT 
RELATIONSHIP 
Authority, subordination and dependency 
HM2008 introduced new behavioral micro-foundations in the theory of the firm at the cost of 
abandoning the asymmetry between owners of physical and human assets presupposed in most 
economic theories of the firm - though to widely varying extents. To examine the asymmetry 
issue, we follow Coase’s recommendation that to soundly approach the employment 
relationship, we must consider how it is legally defined. 
 Although some courts tend to now view “the employment relationship as involving 
elements of common interest and partnership, rather than conflict and subordination” (Brodie, 
2011:4), there is no doubt that imbalance of power is an hallmark of employment relations as 
legally defined. Even though the imbalance hardly exists in some actual specific cases, the 
control of employers over employees is legitimate. It is not only the distribution of property 
rights or economic resources which engenders economic power, it is the employment contract 
itself which is asymmetrical. 
 Authority, subordination and power in employment relationships have been widely 
debated in economics; the essential point is that the employer has some discretion to direct 
certain dimensions of the employee’s behavior. Employment law gives the employer certain 
rights to the “cooperation” of the employee in areas not covered by explicit or implicit 
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agreement (Deakin and Wilkinson, 1995), ie, the employee legally subordinates him/herself to 
the exercise of the employer authority. It is precisely the facts of authority/subordination that 
contribute to attenuate opportunism since it legitimates the implementation of control, 
monitoring and dispute resolution devices. Employment relationships are also more efficient 
than independent contracting because the fact that employers can decide which tasks are to be 
performed bestows flexibility to management costlessly, ie, facilitates adaptation after 
uncertainty is resolved (Simon, 1951; Williamson, 1975). In independent contracting, by 
contrast, tasks are defined in advance and cannot be adjusted to unforeseen circumstances 
without renegotiation. 
 It is worth emphasizing that law scholars systematically mentioned that the obligation 
of cooperation develops, in the employment context, into the requirement of trust and 
confidence on the part of both parties (Brodie, 2011). Kreps (1996:572) also underlines that 
insofar as a party A is given decision-making authority over a party B - which puts B in danger 
of being exploited - party A must be trustworthy and party B must believe that A will not abuse 
her decision-making rights. Likewise, the employee is supposed to obey the employer’s 
directions partly because of a sense of duty. That is, in law and in Kreps writings (Kreps, 1996; 
Baron and Kreps, 2012), it is the moral abilities of both parties that are explicitly supposed to 
ground the enforcement of employment contracts: renouncing on exploiting higher bargaining 
power on the part of employers and obeying “reasonable” orders on the part of employees. 
 Another crucial feature of the employment relationship is the fact that most workers are 
dependent on the relationship with an employer to fulfill three kinds of needs: economic, social 
and psychological. Labor law tries to mitigate the inequality associated to economic dependency 
by being a “countervailing force to counteract the inequality of bargaining power which is 
inherent and must be inherent in the employment relationship” (Brodie, 2011:8). Even when 
alternative employment opportunities are available, most workers have less bargaining power 
than prospective employers and quitting engenders substantial costs. The social and 
psychological dependency results from the functions work came to fulfill in our societies.  
The specificity of the object being exchanged: work 
Most economic modeling of the employment relationship assumes that workers are indifferent 
among a pre-given set of tasks (HM2008; Simon, 1951; and Bolton and Dewatripont (2012) for 
a survey of the mainstream literature) and Coase (1937) specifies that workers are supposed to 
obey “within certain limits”. It is the indifference assumption and the “within certain limits” 
condition that we discuss in the present section. Besides, our discussion will take the HM2008 
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“feelings of entitlement” behavioral assumption seriously, that is, we assume that workers are 
endowed with moral dispositions – more precisely, a sense of justice. 
 A preliminary point to be made is that the employment relationship is a contract 
established between two deeply dissimilar entities: a person – an employee who will perform 
the work in and as a person – and an employer – an impersonal entity which pursues economic 
impersonal goals. As stated by Williamson “the trick is to understand what is being contracted 
for”. In the case at hand, a wage and tasks designed under efficiency constraints are exchanged 
against the performance of work, ie, a human activity undisputedly considered to be an essential 
component of one’s sense of identity, self-worth and emotional well-being. In democratic 
liberal societies employees may legitimately nourish certain expectations towards work but 
these expectations must be confronted with reality. Actually, there has always been a tension 
across time between what firms/societies need be done and what workers deserve to fulfill their 
economic, social and psychological needs. 
Muirhead (2004) – whose insightful arguments inform part of the discussion below – 
depicts the ideal of a meaningful or fulfilling work. This ideal is a noble and democratic longing 
“that reflects that part of the human spirit that affirms its dignity” (Muirhead, 2004:8). What is 
at stake in work is the kind of people one would like to be, the kind of place we would like to be 
part of, and what we think we deserve. In particular, simply by virtue of the capacities people 
bear, liberal societies with their democratic ideal make people expect that these capacities be 
cultivated rather than thwarted and suffocated by the jobs they hold. The relation between 
employee and employer cannot be that of a person who for money provides any kind of service 
considered useful to a given organization. This was what Coase certainly meant with its “within 
limits” condition. Most sociological studies show that workers aspire to pursue a purpose that is 
both personal and recognized socially as important. For part of the meaningfulness of work lies 
in its contributing to the larger society; this is what provides the working life with pride and 
dignity. Workers provide commitment and effort for the sake of “doing their job well”, not just 
for the sake of something outside the work such as money and consumption.  
But the promise of work stands a distance from the lived experience of work which 
often does not and cannot provide the opportunity for individual accomplishment. Work is not 
actually designed to allow personal fulfillment but rather to match productivity constraints and 
to meet social needs that sometimes generate dirty, painful and monotonous work. This is what 
stands at the heart of Muirhead’s reflection: the existence of a tension between “personal fit” 
and “social fit”. There is, on the one hand, the expectation of a meaningful and fulfilling work, 
one that contributes to developing one’s distinctive capacities and purposes (the “personal fit”); 
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and there are, on the other hand, tasks in society that need be performed (the social fit). Social 
fit and personal fit are not easily reconciled because, even though work is endlessly 
differentiated and persons have widely different aptitudes, societies in every age need tasks 
done that are not fulfilling to do by anyone.
9
   
Another issue is the necessity of work: the experience of work is not something we can 
forgo if we feel like it; for many it is a command rather than an option. This is in tension with 
the liberal ideal of freedom and it seems to remove any room for the moral evaluation of work, 
ie, for justice claims about work. However, the fact that in the world of work freedom is always 
constrained does not imply that we have to abdicate from expecting that work provide us with 
what we morally deserve – a work that fits us. Nonetheless, when mainstream economics 
considers that the employee’s consent to enter into a subordination relationship is an expression 
of unrestrained free choice and when it assumes that employees are indifferent to the tasks they 
are assigned, it is implicitly denying the legitimacy of “fitting work” claims. A given job may 
have been voluntarily taken, and contribute to economic efficiency, but nonetheless infringe its 
holder’s sense of dignity. Actual consent, because it supposedly involves mutual benefit, does 
not exhaust the moral issue at hand, that is, the concern with a job addressing one’s needs and 
entitlements.  
This is the original insight of HM2008: showing that feelings of entitlements pervade 
the world of contracts and, therefore, that of work. But in HM2008, entitlements are restricted to 
the pecuniary compensation for the work done – it is the divergence about the valuation of work 
that is at stake, not the content of work itself. HM2008, like most economic models, assume that 
workers are indifferent between a set of pre-given tasks. Their feelings of entitlements 
assumption never addresses the content of work – the fact that workers are entitled to a “fitting” 
work. 
The specificity of work, ie, the fact that it enables people to satisfy a broad range of 
social and psychological needs, may mitigate opportunistic behavior and partly account for the 
observed self-enforcement of employment contracts. But, as underlined by HM2008, 
performing consummately depends on people feeling that their work provides what they feel 
they deserve. In our societies, what people feel they deserve is having the opportunity to 
develop their capacities and a sense of dignity. Otherwise, perfunctory performance becomes 
the only sustainable outcome and pecuniary motives become the major drivers at work. This 
would in fact be consistent with the standard “work as a disutility” assumption, but is totally at 
                                                          
9 Muirhead lengthily develops the case of domestic service in ancient Greece, the nineteenth century and 
contemporary societies. The tension between personal and social fit is not a feature of modern, capitalist 
societies; two millenniums ago, Aristotle solved the problem of meaningless work by legitimizing slavery. 
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odds with the demands real world people nourish towards work. For even if work is a necessity, 
the way it is organized is not; rather the organization of work has always been a matter of social 




We began by examining the human traits that the leading mainstream economic theories of the 
firm consider relevant to understand the functioning of firms. We pointed out that the 
opportunism assumption – launched by Williamson (1975) and subsequently adopted by all 
mainstream literature – exclusively contemplates the immoral facet of human behavior. By 
contrast, the “feelings of entitlement” assumption, advanced by Hart and Moore (2008), 
acknowledges the possibility of economic agents displaying both the negative and positive 
facets of moral behavior. The fact that these “non-standard ingredients”, which introduce a 
normative dimension alongside the standard calculative dimension in the conception of 
economic behavior, were proposed by the most individualistic of all accounts of the firm - the 
incomplete contract theory approach - is both perplexing and promising.  
The main aim of the present paper was to offer tentative responses to our guiding 
question “why is the transaction of work more efficiently conducted in a firm than a market?” 
or, termed differently, why is the employment relationship an efficient mode of coordination? 
To pursue this objective, we outlined a comprehensive account of the specificity of the 
employment relationship when compared to independent contracting, specificity that we argue 
goes beyond the transaction cost economizing allowed by the authority/subordination feature of 
employment relationships. 
  A brief overview of the relational contract literature, in law and in economics, provides 
a partial answer to our inquiry: the use of human assets inside organizations is more efficient 
than outside contracts because it favors “relational contracting”. The simple fact that people deal 
with each other over time – an opportunity offered by the integration into an organization - 
increases the value to each of continuing to interact. It is recognized in this literature that the 
value of the interaction is distinct from the economic value it generates. But the economics 
relational contract literature does not do justice to the crucial singularity of the employment 
contract: the specificity of the object being exchanged.  
We then focused on the specificity of work – a subject much less researched in social 
sciences that it may seem and totally disregarded in economics. Along with its economic role, 
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work has an intrinsic value for most workers since it is a source of identity, self-realization and 
social status. We argue that the fact that people expect work to satisfy a broad range of social 
and psychological needs
10
 moderates opportunistic behavior at work and motivates consummate 
performance. Of course, work is a specific human activity both when it is the object of an 
independent contract and an employment relationship but this does not impedes that it does 
embody a specificity of the employment relationship. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994) clearly 
established that the employment contract is more efficient than independent contracting the 
more difficult it is to evaluate and measure performance, that is, the more uncertainty there is 
about the workers’ behavior. Stated in different terms, this means that the employment contract 
is more efficient the greater is the difference between perfunctory and consummate 
performance. 
To sum up, our original responses to our guiding question is that the transaction of work 
is more efficiently conducted in a firm than a market not just because of the 
authority/subordination nature of the employment relationship but also because i) “relational 
contracting” within firms has an intrinsic value that helps enforcing contractual commitments 
and ii) when provided with the opportunity to satisfy their social and psychological needs, that 
is, when they feel well treated, workers commit to their work and perform consummately rather 
than perfunctorily. In any case, to soundly understand the efficiency of the employment 
relationship, one must go beyond the calculative abilities of homo economicus and endow him 
with moral abilities. 
The trends that mark the recent evolution of the world of work, namely, the erosion of 
institutional affiliations, the vanishing of legal protection for the most vulnerable (the neither 
self-employed nor employed), and the individualization and quantification of performance 
standards and assessments may result in a severe deterioration of relational norms, 
trustworthiness and a growth of aggrievement feelings. In such circumstances, perfunctory 
performance might become the standard behavioral norm, with the negative efficiency effects 
highlighted by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994). Reputational concerns are often evoked to 
argue that employers spontaneously resist the temptation to exploit employees (Baron and 
Kreps, 2012), but what if firms in a given period or in a given place all become exploitative, or 
if the conditions required to sustain reputation, namely the state of the labour market, are not 
met? 
 
                                                          
10 It must nonetheless be noted that not all available and needed jobs are able to fulfill such expectations 
and requirements. 
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